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ABSTRACT
We discuss the design of efficient scrip systems and develop
tools for empirically analyzing them. For those interested in
the empirical study of scrip systems,
we demonstrate how characteristics of agents in a system
can be inferred from the equilibrium distribution of money.
From the perspective of a system designer, we examine the
effect of the money supply on social welfare and show that
social welfare is maximized by increasing the money supply
up to the point that the system experiences a “monetary
crash,” where money is sufficiently devalued that no agent
is willing to perform a service. We also examine the im-
plications of the presence of altruists and hoarders on the
performance of the system. While a small number of altru-
ists may improve social welfare, too many can also cause the
system to experience a monetary crash, which may be bad
for social welfare. Hoarders generally decrease social wel-
fare but, surprisingly, they also promote system stability by
helping prevent monetary crashes. In addition, we provide
new technical tools for analyzing and computing equilibria
by showing that our model exhibits strategic complementar-
ities, which implies that there exist equilibria in pure strate-
gies that can be computed efficiently.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.4 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Distributed
Systems; I.2.11 [Artificial Intelligence]: Distributed Arti-
ficial Intelligence—Multiagent systems; J.4 [Social and Be-
havioral Sciences]: Economics; K.4.4 [Computers and
Society]: Electronic Commerce
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1. INTRODUCTION
Historically, non-governmental organizations have issued
their own currencies for a wide variety of purposes. These
currencies, known as scrip, have been used in company towns
where government issued
currency was scarce [18], in Washington DC to reduce the
robbery rate of bus drivers [21], and in Ithaca (New York) to
promote fairer pay and improve the local economy [8]. Scrip
systems are also becoming more prevalent in online systems.
To give just some examples, the currencies of online virtual
worlds such as Everquest and Second Life are a form of
scrip; market-based solutions using scrip systems have been
suggested
for applications such as system-resource allocation [12],
managing replication and query
optimization in a distributed database [15], and allocating
experimental time on a wireless sensor network test bed [3];
a number of sophisticated scrip systems have been proposed
[5, 7, 20] to allow agents to pool resources while avoiding
what is known as free riding, where agents take advantage
of the resources the system provides while providing none
of their own (as Adar and Huberman [2] have shown, this
behavior certainly takes place in systems such as Gnutella);
and Yootles [14] uses a scrip system as a way of helping
groups make decisions using economic mechanisms without
involving real money.
Creating a scrip system creates a new market where goods
and services can be exchanged that may have been imprac-
tical or undesirable to implement with standard currency.
However, the potential benefits of a scrip system will not
necessarily be realized simply by creating the framework to
support one. The story of the Capitol Hill Baby Sitting Co-
op [16], popularized by Krugman [10], provides a cautionary
tale. The Capitol Hill Baby Sitting Co-op was a group of
parents working on Capitol Hill who agreed to cooperate to
provide babysitting services to each other. In order to en-
force fairness, they issued a supply of scrip with each coupon
worth a half hour of babysitting. At one point, the co-op
had a recession. Many people wanted to save up coupons for
when they wanted to spend an evening out. As a result, they
went out less and looked for more opportunities to babysit.
Since a couple could earn coupons only when another couple
went out, no one could accumulate more, and the problem
only got worse.
After a number of failed attempts to solve the problem,
such as mandating a certain frequency of going out, the
co-op started issuing more coupons. The results were strik-
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ing. Since couples had a sufficient reserve of coupons, they
were more comfortable spending them. This in turn made
it much easier to earn coupons when a couple’s supply got
low. Unfortunately, the amount of scrip grew to the point
that most of the couples felt “rich.” They had enough scrip
for the foreseeable future, so naturally they didn’t want to
devote their evening to babysitting. As a result, couples who
wanted to go out were unable to find another couple willing
to babysit.
This anecdote shows that the amount of scrip in circula-
tion can have a significant impact on the effectiveness of a
scrip system. If there is too little money in the system, few
agents will be able to afford service. At the other extreme,
if there is too much money in the system, people feel rich
and stop looking for work. Both of these extremes lead to
inefficient outcomes. This suggests that there is an opti-
mal amount of money, and that nontrivial deviations from
the optimum towards either extreme can lead to significant
degradation in the performance of the system.
Motivated by these observations, we study the behavior
of scrip systems with a heterogeneous population of agents.
We prove a number of theoretical
results, and use them to gain insights into the design and
analysis of practical scrip systems.
The motivation for our interest in heterogeneous popu-
lations of agents should be clear. In the babysitting coop
example, we would not expect all couples to feel equally
strongly about going out nor to feel the “pain” of babysit-
ting equally. In earlier work [4], we showed that with a ho-
mogeneous population of agents, we could assume that all
agents were following a threshold strategy : an agent who has
more than a certain threshold of money will not volunteer
to work; below the threshold, he will volunteer. Perhaps not
surprisingly, we show that even with a heterogeneous popu-
lation, each different type of agent can still be characterized
by a threshold (although different types of agents will have
different thresholds).
We also characterize the distribution of money in the sys-
tem in equilibrium, as a function of the fraction of agents of
each type. Using this characterization, we show that we can
infer the threshold strategies that different types of agents
are using simply from the distribution of money. This shows
that, by simply observing a scrip system in operation, we
can learn a great deal about the agents in the system. Not
only is such information of interest to social scientists and
marketers, it is also important to a system designer trying
to optimize the performance of the system. This is because
agents that have no money will be unable to pay for service;
agents that are at their threshold are unwilling to serve oth-
ers. We show that, typically, it is the number of agents with
no money that has the more significant impact on the over-
all efficiency of the system. Thus, the way to optimize the
performance of the system is to try to minimize the number
of agents with no money.
As we show, we can decrease the number of agents with
no money by increasing the money supply. However, this
only works up to a point. Once a certain amount of money
is reached, the system experiences a monetary crash: there
is so much money that, in equilibrium, everyone will feel
rich and no agents are willing to work. The point where
the system crashes gives us a sharp threshold. We show
that, to get optimal performance, we want the total amount
of money in the system to be as close as possible to the
threshold, but not to go over it. If the amount of money
in the system is over threshold, we get the worst possible
equilibrium, where all agents have utility 0.
The analysis above assumes that all users have some-
what similar motivation: in particular, they do not get plea-
sure simply from performing a service, and are interested in
money only to the extent that they can use it to get services
performed. But in real systems, not all agents have this mo-
tivation. Some of the more common “nonstandard” agents
are altruists and hoarders. Altruists are willing to satisfy
all requests, and do not require money in return; hoarders
never make requests, and just hoard the money they make
by satisfying requests. Studies of the Gnutella peer-to-peer
file-sharing network have shown that one percent of agents
satisfy fifty percent of the requests [2]. These agents are
doing significantly more work for others than they will ever
have done for them, so can be viewed as altruists. Anecdotal
evidence also suggests that the introduction of any sort of
currency seems to inspire hoarding behavior on the part of
some agents, regardless of the benefit of possessing money.
Altruists and hoarders have opposite effects on a system:
having altruists is essentially equivalent to adding money;
having hoarders is essentially equivalent to removing it. With
enough altruists in the system, the system has a monetary
crash, in the sense that standard agents stop being willing to
provide service, just as when there is too much money in the
system. We show that, until we get to the point where the
system crashes, the utility of standard agents is improved
by the presence of altruists. However, they can be worse off
in a system that experiences a monetary crash due to the
presence of many altruists than they would be if there were
no altruists at all. Similarly, we show that, as the fraction of
hoarders increases, standard agents begin to suffer because
there is effectively less money in circulation. On the other
hand, hoarders can improve the stability of a system. Since
hoarders are willing to accept an infinite amount of money,
they can prevent the monetary crash that would otherwise
occur as money was added. In any case, our results show
that the presence of both altruists and hoarders can be mit-
igated by appropriately controlling the money supply.
In order to examine these issues, we use a model of a scrip
system that we developed in previous work [4]. While the
model was developed with the workings of a peer-to-peer
network in mind and assumed that all agents were identical,
the model applies to a wide variety of scrip systems, and
makes perfect sense even with a heterogeneous population
of agents. We showed that, under reasonable assumptions,
a system with only one type of agent has a cooperative equi-
librium using threshold strategies. Here we extend the the-
oretical results to the case of multiple types of agents. We
also introduce a new argument for the existence of equilibria
that relies on the monotonicity of the best-reply function.
We show that if some agents change their strategy to one
with a higher threshold, no other agent can do better by
lowering his threshold.
This makes our game one with what Milgrom and Roberts
[11] call strategic complementarities,
who (using the results of Tarski [17] and Topkis [19])
showed that there are pure strategy equilibria in
such games, since the process of starting with a strategy
profile where everyone always volunteers (i.e., the threshold
is ∞) and then iteratively computing the best-reply profile
to it
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converges to a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. (Our
earlier results guaranteed only an equilibrium in mixed strate-
gies.) This procedure also provides an efficient algorithm for
explicitly computing equilibria.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we review our earlier model. In Section 3, we prove basic
results about the existence and form of equilibria. Sections
4, 5, and 6 examine the practical implications of our theo-
retical results. Section 4 examines the distribution of money
in the system. We give an explicit formula for the distribu-
tion of money in the system based, and show how it can be
used to infer the number of types of agents present and the
strategy each type is using. In Section 5, we examine how
a system designer can optimize the performance of the sys-
tem by adjusting the money supply appropriately. Section 6
examines how altruists and hoarders affect the system. We
conclude in Section 7.
2. OUR MODEL
We begin by reviewing our earlier model of a scrip system
with n agents. In the system, one agent can request a service
which another agent can volunteer to fulfill. When a service
is performed by agent i for agent j, agent i derives some
utility from having that service performed, while agent j
loses some utility for performing it. The amount of utility
gained by having a service performed and the amount lost
be performing it may depend on the agent. We assume that
agents have a type t drawn from some finite set T of types.
We can describe the entire population of agents using the
triple (T, ~f , n), where ft is the fraction with type t and n
is the total number of agents. For most of the paper, we
consider only what we call standard agents. These are agents
who derive no pleasure from performing a service, and for
whom money has no intrinsic value. We can characterize
the type of an agent by a tuple t = (αt, βt, γt, δt, ρt), where
• αt reflects the cost of satisfying the request;
• βt is the probability that the agent can satisfy the re-
quest (an agent may not be able to satisfy all requests;
for example, in a
babysitting co-op, an agent may not be able to babysit
every night);
• γt measures the utility an agent gains for having a
request satisfied;
• δt is the rate at which the agents discounts utility (so
a unit of utility in k steps is worth only δk as much
as a unit of utility now)—intuitively, δt is a measure
of an agent’s patience (the larger δt the more patient
an agent is, since a unit of utility tomorrow is worth
almost as much as a unit today); and
• ρt represents the (relative) request rate (since not all
agents make requests at the same rate) —intuitively,
ρt characterizes an agent’s “neediness”.
We model the system as running for an infinite number of
rounds. In each round, an agent is picked with probability
proportional to ρ to request service. Receiving service costs
some amount of scrip that we normalize to $1.
If the chosen agent does not have enough scrip, nothing
will happen in this round. Otherwise, each agent of type t is
able to satisfy this request with probability βt, independent
of previous behavior. If at least one agent is able and willing
to satisfy the request, and the requester has type t, then the
requester gets a benefit of γt utils (the job is done) and one
of the volunteers is chosen at random to fulfill the request. If
the chosen volunteer has type t′, then that agent pays a cost
of αt′ utils, and receives a dollar as payment. The utility
of all other agents is unchanged in that round. The total
utility of an agent is the discounted sum of round utilities.
To model the fact that requests will happen more frequently
the more agents there are, we assume that the time between
rounds is 1/n.
This captures the intuition that things are really hap-
pening in parallel and that adding more agents should not
change an agent’s request rate.
One significant assumption we have made here is that
prices are fixed. While there are many systems with stan-
dard “posted” prices (the babysitting co-op is but one of
many examples), it certainly does not always hold in prac-
tice. However, given the potential costs of negotiating prices
in a large system,
it does not seem so unreasonable to assume fixed prices.
Fixed prices have the added advantage of making the anal-
ysis of agent strategies simpler, because the an agent knows
the future cost of
requests rather than it being set as part of the equilibrium
and
potentially varying over time. We discuss this issue fur-
ther at the end of Section 5.
For more discussion of this model
and its assumptions, see [4].
Our framework allows agents to differ in a number of pa-
rameters. Differences in the parameters α, γ, and δ seem
easier to deal with than differences in the other parameters
because they do not affect the action of the system except
through determining the optimal strategy. We refer to a
population of types that differs only in these parameters
as one that exhibits only payoff heterogeneity. Most of our
results consider only payoff heterogeneity. We do not be-
lieve that variation β or ρ fundamentally changes our results;
however, our existing techniques are insufficient to analyze
this case. There is a long history of work in the economics
literature on the distribution of wealth dating back to the
late 19th century [13],
although this work does not consider the distribution of
money in the particular setting of interest to us.
Hens et al. [6] consider a related model. There are a num-
ber of differences between the models. First, in the Hens
et al. model, there is essentially only one type of agent, but
an agent’s utility for providing service (our γt) may change
over time. Thus, at any time, there will be agents who differ
in their utility. At each round, we assume that one agent is
chosen (by nature) to make a request for service, while other
agents decide whether or not to provide it. In the Hens et
al. model, at each round, each agent decides whether to pro-
vide service, request service, or opt out, as a function of his
utilities and the amount of money he has. They assume that
there is no cost for providing service and everyone is able to
provide service (i.e., in our language, αt = 0 and βt = 1).
Under this assumption, a system with optimal performance
is one where half the agents request service and the other
half are willing to provide it.
Despite these differences, Hens et al. also show that agents
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will use a threshold strategy. However, although they have
inefficient equilibria, because there is no cost for providing
service, their model does not exhibit the monetary crashes
that our model can exhibit.
3. THEORETICAL RESULTS
In this section, we derive several basic results that provide
insight into the behavior of scrip systems with a heteroge-
neous population of agents. We first show that we can focus
on a particularly simple class of strategies: threshold strate-
gies.
The strategy Sk is the one in which the agent volunteers
if and only if his current amount of money is less than some
fixed threshold k. The intuition behind using a threshold
strategy is easy to explain: A rational agent with too little
money will be concerned that he will run out and then want
to make a request; on the other hand, a rational agent with
plenty of money would not want to work, because by the
time he has managed to spend all his money, the util will
have less value than the present cost of working. By choosing
an appropriate threshold, a rational agent can deal with
both concerns.
In [4], we showed that if there is only one type of agent,
it suffices to consider only threshold strategies: we show
that (under certain mild assumptions) there exists a non-
trivial equilibrium where all agents use the same threshold
strategy. Here, we extend this result to the case of payoff-
heterogeneous agents. To prove this result, we extend the
characterization of the distribution of money in a system
where each agent uses the threshold strategy
provided in Theorem 3.1 of [4]. To understand the char-
acterization, note that as agents spend and earn money, the
distribution of money in the system will change over time.
However, some distributions will be far more likely than oth-
ers. For example, consider a system with only two dollars.
With n agents, there are O(n2) ways to assign the dollars to
different agents and O(n) ways to assign them to the same
agent. If each way of assigning the two dollars to agents is
equally likely, we are far more likely to see a distribution
of money where two agents have one dollar each than one
where a single agent has two dollars. It is well known [9]
that the distribution which has the most ways of being re-
alized is the one that maximizes entropy. (Recall that the
entropy of a probability distribution on a finite space S is
−
P
s∈S µ(s) log(µ(s)).)
Note that many distributions have no way of being real-
ized. For example if the average amount of money available
per agent is $2 (so that if there are n agents, there is $2n in
the system), then the distribution where every agent has 3
dollars is impossible. Similarly, if every agent is playing S3,
then
a distribution that has some fraction of agents with $4 is
impossible. Consider a scrip system where a fraction πk use
strategy Sk. (We are mainly interested in cases where πk = 0
for all but finitely many k’s, but our results apply even if
countably many different threshold strategies are used.) Let
Mki be the fraction of agents that play Sk and have i dollars.
Then the system must satisfy the following
two constraints:
∞X
k=0
kX
i=0
iMki = m (1)
kX
i=0
Mki = πk for each k. (2)
These constraints capture the requirements that (1) the
average amount of money is m and (2) a fraction πk of the
agents play Sk. As the following theorem shows, in equi-
librium, a large system is unlikely to have a distribution
far from the one that maximizes entropy subject to these
constraints.
Theorem 3.1. Given a payoff-heterogeneous system with
n agents where a fraction πk of agents plays strategy Sk and
the average amount of money is m, let M~π,n,m(t) be the
the random variable that gives the distribution of money
in the system at time t, and let M∗~π,m be the distribution that
maximizes entropy subject to constraints (1) and (2). Then
for all ǫ, there exists nǫ such that, for all n > nǫ, there exists
a time t∗ such that for all t > t∗,
Pr(||M~π,n,m(t)−M
∗
~π,m||2 > ǫ) < ǫ.
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Proof. (Sketch) This theorem is proved for the homoge-
nous case as Theorem 3.1 of [4]. Most of the proof applies
without change to a payoff-heterogeneous population, but
one key piece differs. This piece involves showing that each
possible assignment of money to agents is equally likely; this
makes maximum entropy an accurate description of the like-
lihood of getting a particular distribution of money. We
now prove this by considering the Markov chain whose
states are the possible assignments of dollars to agents and
whose transitions correspond to the possible outcomes of a
round, and showing that it has a uniform limit distribution.
Lemma 3.1. Given a scrip system with payoff-heterogeneous
population (T, ~f, n). where all agents play some (possibly dif-
ferent) threshold strategy, the limit distribution of the Markov
chain that describes the evolution of the system is the uni-
form distribution.
Proof. A sufficient condition for the limit distribution
to be uniform is that for every pair of states s and s′, Pss′ =
Ps′s (where
Pss′ is the probability of transitioning from s to s
′).
If Pss′ > 0, there must be some pair of agents u and v
such that
u has one more dollar in state s than he does in s′, while v
has one more dollar in s′ than in s. Every other agent must
have the same amount of money in both s and s′. The key
observation is that, in both s and s′, every agent other
than u and v will make the same decision about whether to
volunteer in each state. Additionally, in state s, v is willing
to volunteer if u is selected to make a request while in state
s′, u is willing to volunteer if v is selected to make a request.
An explicit calculation of the probabilities shows that this
means that Pss′ = Ps′s.
1SinceM~π,n,m(t) andM
∗
~π,m are finite distributions, they can
be viewed as vectors; || · ||2 is then the standard L2 distance
between vectors.
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(Note that the last step in the lemma is where payoff
heterogeneity is important.
If u is of type t, v is of type t′, and either βt 6= βt′ or
ρt 6= ρt′ , then it will, in general, not be the the case that
Pss′ = Ps′s.)
Theorem 3.1 tells us that we can generally expect the dis-
tribution of money to be close to the distribution that maxi-
mizes entropy. We can in fact give an exact characterization
of this distribution.
Corollary 3.1. (M∗~π,m)
k
i = πkλ
i/
Pk
j=0 λ
j where λ is
chosen to ensure that (1) is satisfied.
Proof. The distribution we are looking for is the one
that maximizes entropy subject to (1) and (2). This means
that we want to maximize
X
k
kX
i=0
−Mki logM
k
i
subject to (1) and (2). Standard techniques, using Lagrange
multipliers [9], show thatMki must be of the given form.
We now show that agents have best responses among
threshold strategies.
Theorem 3.2. For all m, there exist δ∗ and n∗ such that
if (T, ~f, n) is a payoff-heterogeneous population with n > n∗
and δt > δ
∗ for all types t ∈ T , then if each type t plays
some threshold strategy Skt then every
agent of type t has an ǫ-best reply 2 of the form Sk′
t
. Fur-
thermore, either k′t is unique or there are two best replies,
which have the form k′t and k
′
t + 1 for some k
′
t.
Proof. This was proved for the homogeneous case as
Theorem 4.1 of [4]. The proof for the heterogeneous case
is literally identical, except that we use
Theorem 3.1 in place of the analogous result for the ho-
mogeneous case.
Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.1 assume that all agents are
playing threshold strategies; we have not yet shown that
there is a nontrivial equilibrium where agents do so (all
agents playing S0 is a trivial equilibrium). Our previous
approach to proving the existence of equilibria was to make
the space of threshold strategies continuous.
For example, we considered strategies such as S5.6, where
the agent plays S6 with probability 0.6 and S5 with proba-
bility 0.4.
We could then use standard fixed point techniques. We
believe that these arguments can be extended to the
payoff-heterogeneous case, but we can in fact show more.
Our experiments showed that, in practice, we could always
find equilibria in pure strategies. As we now show, this is
not just an artifact of the agent types we examined.
Given a payoff-heterogeneous population, let ~k denote the
strategy profile where type t plays the threshold strategy
2In [4], we simply described this as a best reply rather than
an ǫ-best reply, and noted that it might not be a best reply
if the distribution is far from the maximum entropy distri-
bution (which we know is very unlikely). Considering ǫ-best
replies and ǫ-Nash equilibria formalizes this intuition.
Skt . Let BR
t
(T,~f,n),m
(~k) be the best reply for an agent of
type t given that the population is (T, ~f, n), the average
amount of money is m, and the strategy profile is ~k. By
Theorem 3.2, for sufficiently large n, this threshold is inde-
pendent of n and is either unique or consists of two adjacent
strategies; in the latter case, we take BRt
(T,~f,n),m
(~k) to be
the smaller of the two values. We use BRt
(T,~f),m
(~k) to denote
this n-independent unique best response.
Lemma 3.2. For all m there exist δ∗ and n∗ such that,
if (T, ~f, n) is a payoff-heterogeneous population with n > n∗
and
δt > δ
∗ for all t, then the function BRt
(T,~f),m
(~k) is non-
decreasing.
Proof. (Sketch) The population (T, ~f , n) and ~k induce
a distribution ~π over strategies. It is not hard to show that
if ~k′ ≥ ~k (i.e., k′t ≥ kt for all types t ∈ T ), then (M
∗
~π,m)
k′
t
0 ≥
(M∗~π,m)
kt
0 and (M
∗
~π,m)
k′
t
k′
t
≤ (M∗~π,m)
kt
kt
for all types t. This
means that, with ~k′,
more agents will have zero dollars and be unable to af-
ford a download, and fewer agents will be at their threshold
amount of money. As a consequence, with ~k′ there will be
fewer opportunities to earn money and more agents wish-
ing to volunteer for those opportunities that do exist. This
means that agents will earn money less often while wanting
to spend money at least as often (more volunteers means
there is more likely to be someone able to satisfy a request).
Therefore, with ~k′, agents will run out of money sooner.
Thus the value of earning an extra dollar increases and so
the best reply can only increase.
Theorem 3.3. For all m there exist δ∗ and n∗ such that,
if (T, ~f, n) is a payoff-heterogeneous population with n > n∗
and
δt > δ
∗ for all t, then there exists a nontrivial ǫ-Nash equi-
librium where all agents of type t play Skt for some integer
kt.
Proof. (Sketch) Let BR(T,~f),m(
~k) be the strategy profile
~k′ such that k′t = BR
t
(T,~f),m
(~k). By Lemma 3.2, BR(T,~f),m
is non-decreasing,
so Tarski’s fixedpoint theorem [17] guarantees the exis-
tence of a greatest and least fixed point; these fixed points
are equilibria. The least fixed point is the trivial equilib-
rium.
We can compute the greatest fixed point by starting with
the strategy profile (∞, . . . ,∞) (where each agent uses the
strategy S∞ of always volunteering) and considering best-
reply dynamics, that is, iteratively computing the best-reply
strategy profile. This process converges to the greatest fixed
point, which is an equilibrium (and is bound to be an equi-
librium in pure strategies, since the best reply is always a
pure strategy). Furthermore, it is not hard to show that
there exists some δ∗ such that if δt ≥ δ
∗ for all types t, then
there exists a strategy profile ~k such that BR(T,~f),m(
~k) ≥
~k. Monotonicity guarantees that if ~k∗ is the greatest fixed
point of BRt
(T,~f),m
, then ~k∗ ≥ ~k. Thus, the greatest fixed
point gives a nontrivial equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 3.3 also provides an algorithm for
finding equilibria that seems efficient in practice. Start with
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the strategy profile (∞, . . . ,∞) and iterate the best-reply
dynamics until an equilibrium is reached.
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Figure 1: A hypothetical best-reply function with
one type of agent.
There is a subtlety in our results. In general, there may
be many equilibria. From the perspective of
social welfare, some will be better than others. As we
show in Section 5, strategies that use smaller (but nonzero)
thresholds increase social welfare. Consider the best-reply
function with a single type of agent shown in shown in Figure
1. An equilibrium must have BR(k) = k, so will be a point
on the line y = x. This example has three equilibria: S0,
S5, and S10; S5 is the equilibrium that maximizes social
welfare. However, we cannot use best-reply dynamics to get
to S5, unless we start there. Applying best-reply dynamics
to a starting point above 10 will lead to convergence at S10;
this is also true if we start at a point between 5 and 10.
On the other hand, starting at a point below 5 will lead to
convergence at S0, the trivial equilibrium. Thus, although
S5 is a more efficient equilibrium than S10, it is unstable.
The only equilibrium that we can guarantee is stable is the
maximum one (i.e., the greatest fixed point); thus, we focus
on this equilibrium in the rest of the paper.
4. IDENTIFYING USER STRATEGIES
In Section 3, we used maximum entropy to get an explicit
formula for the distribution of money given the fraction πk of
agents using each strategy Sk, k ≥ 0: M
k
i = πkλ
i/
Pk
j=0 λ
j .
In this section, we want to go in the opposite direction: given
the distribution of money, we want to infer the fraction fk
of agents using each strategy Sk, for each k. For those inter-
ested in studying the agents of a scrip system, knowing the
fraction of agents using each strategy can provide a window
into the preferences of those agents. For system designers,
this knowledge is useful because, as we show in Section 5,
how much money the system can handle without crashing
depends on the fraction of agents of each type.
In equilibrium, the distribution of money has the form
described in Corollary 3.1.
Note that in general we do not expect to see exactly this
distribution at any given time,
but it follows from Theorem 3.1 that, after sufficient time,
the distribution is unlikely to be very far from it.
Does this distribution help us identify the population?
Without further constraints,
it does not. Say that a distribution of money M
(where Mi is the fraction of agents with i dollars) is fully
supported if there do not exist
i and j such that i < j, Mj > 0, and Mi = 0. As the
following lemma shows, a fully supported distribution can
be explained in an infinite number of different ways. We
take an “explanation” of M (which has average amount of
money m) to consist of a distribution ~π over strategies such
that if a πk fraction of agents use strategy Sk then
M∗~π,m = M (i.e., the maximum entropy distribution that
results from those strategies will be M).
Lemma 4.1. IfM is a fully supported distribution of money
with finite support, there there exist an infinite number of
explanations of M .
Proof. Fix a value of λ. Then M and λ determine a
distribution ~π as follows. Suppose that k is the maximum
amount of money that any agent has under M (this is well
defined since the support of M is finite, by assumption).
Then we take πk to be the unique value that satisfies
Mk = πkλ
k/(
kX
i=0
λi).
Note that Mj =
P
iM
i
j . Therefore,
once we have defined πk, we can take πk−1 to be the
unique value that
satisfies
Mk−1 = πkλ
k−1/(
kX
i=0
λi) + πk−1λ
k−1/(
k−1X
i=0
λi).
Iterating this process uniquely defines ~π. However, ~π may
not be a valid explanation, since some πj may be negative.
This happens exactly when
Mj <
kX
l=j+1
πlλ
j/(
lX
i=0
λi).
As λ grows large, the terms on the right side of this
inequality all tend towards 0. Thus, taking λ sufficiently
large ensures that πj ≥ 0 for all j. By construction, these
values of πj are of a form that satisfied constraints (1) and
(2), so π is a valid explanation forM . Continuing to increase
λ will give an infinite number of different explanations.
We have not yet
shown that there are types of agents for which the strate-
gies in a given explanation are the strategies used in equi-
librium. However, by examining the decision problem that
determines the optimal threshold strategy for an agent, it
can be shown that the parameters α, γ, and δ can be set so
as to make any threshold strategy optimal.
Lemma 4.2. LetM be the distribution of money in a non-
trivial system and ~π be an explanation for M . Then for all
β > 0, ρ > 0, and k, there exist α, γ, and δ such that Sk is
the best reply for an agent of type (α, β, γ, δ, ρ) to ~π.
Proof. (Sketch) Consider the decision problem faced by
an agent when comparing Si to Si+1. Si and Si+1 differ only
in what they do when an agent has i dollars.
As Theorem 4.1 of [4] shows, to decide whether or not
to volunteer if he has $i, an agent should determine the
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expected value of having a request satisfied when he runs
out of money if he has i dollars and plays
Si, and volunteer if this value is greater than α. The
parameters of the random walk that determines this expec-
tation are determined by i, M , and ~π. We can make Sk
optimal by fixing some α and γ and then adjusting δ so that
not working becomes superior exactly at i = k + 1.
Lemma 4.1 shows thatM has an infinite number of expla-
nations. Lemma 4.2 shows that we can find an equilibrium
corresponding to each of them. Given an explanation ~π, we
can use Lemma 4.2 to find a type tj for which strategy Sj
with j in the support of ~π is the best reply to M and ~π.
Taking T = {tj | j ∈ supp(~π)} and fj = πj gives us a popu-
lation for which M is the equilibrium distribution of money.
This type of population seems unnatural;
it requires one type for each possible amount of money.
We are typically interested in a more parsimonious explana-
tion, one that requires relatively few types, for reasons the
following lemma makes clear.
Lemma 4.3. Let ~π be the true explanation for M . If k
is the largest threshold in the support of ~π and s is the size
of the support of ~π, then any other explanation will have a
support of size at least k − s.
Proof. We know that Mki = πkλ
i/
Pk
j=0 λ
j , where λ is
the (unique) value that satisfies constraint (1). Let bk =
πk/
Pk
j=0 λ
j ; then Mki = λ
ibk, and Mi =
P
kM
k
i = Biλ
i,
where Bi =
P
k≥i bk. Note that if πi−1 = 0, thenBi = Bi−1,
so Mi/Mi−1 = λ. Since s strategies get positive probability
according to ~π, at least k−s of the ratios Mi/Mi−1 with 1 ≤
i ≤ k must have value λ. Any other explanation will have
a different value λ′ satisfying constraint (1). This means
that the k− s ratios with value λ must correspond to places
where πi > 0. Thus the support of any other explanation
must be at least k − s.
If s≪ k, Lemma 4.3 gives us a strong reason for preferring
the minimal explanation (i.e., the one with the smallest sup-
port); any other explanation will involve significantly more
types. For s = 3 and k = 50, the smallest explanation has a
support of at most three thresholds, and thus requires three
types; the next smallest explanation requires at least
47 types. Thus, if the number of types of agents is rel-
atively small, the minimal explanation will be the correct
one.
The proof of Lemma 4.3 also gives us an algorithm for
finding this minimal explanation. We know thatMi = Biλ
i.
Therefore logMi = logBi+i log λ. This means that in a plot
of logMi, ranges of i where Si is not
played will be a line with slope λ. Thus, the minimal ex-
planation can be found by finding the minimum number of
lines of constant slope that fit the data. For a simple exam-
ple of how such a distribution might look, Figure 2 shows
an equilibrium distribution of money for the population
({(.05, 1, 1, .95, 1), (.15, 1, 1, .95, 1)}, (.3, .7), 1000)
(i.e., the only difference between the types is it costs the
second type three times as much to satisfy a request) with
m = 4 and the equilibrium strategies (20, 13). Figure 3 has
the same distribution plotted on a log scale. Note the two
lines with the same slope (λ) and the break at 14.
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Figure 2: Distribution of money with two types of
agents.
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Figure 3: Log of the distribution of money with two
types of agents.
Now we have an understanding of how we can take a dis-
tribution of money and infer from it the minimal explana-
tion of the number of types of agents, the fraction of the
population composed of each type, and the strategy each
type is playing. (Note that we cannot distinguish multiple
types playing the same strategy.) We would like to use this
information to learn about
the preferences of agents. The key observation is that
the strategy chosen by an agent will be a best reply to the
strategies of the other agents. The proof of Lemma 4.2 shows
that from M and ~π we can compute the parameters that
control the random walk
taken by an agent playing strategy Sk starting with k dol-
lars until he runs out of money. This enables us to compute
the expected stopping time of the random walk and, from
this, a type for which Sk is a best reply. This argument
gives us constraints on the set of types for which Sk is opti-
mal. These constraints still allow quite a few possible types.
However, suppose that over time T , the set of types, remains
constant but ~f , n, andm all vary as agents join and leave the
system. A later observation with a slightly different popula-
tion (but the same T ) would give another equilibrium with
new constraints on the types of the agents. A number of
such observations potentially reveal enough information to
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allow strong inferences about agent types.
Thus far we have implicitly assumed that there are only
a small number of types of agents in a system. Given that a
type is defined by five real numbers, it is perhaps more rea-
sonable to assume that each agent has a different type, but
there is a small number of “clusters” of agents with similar
types. For example, we might believe that generally agents
either place a high value or a low value on receiving service.
While the exact value may vary, the types of two low-value
agents or two high-value agents will be quite similar. We
have also assumed in our analysis that all agents play their
optimal threshold strategy. However, computing this
optimum may be too difficult for many agents. Even ig-
noring computational issues, agents may have insufficient in-
formation about their exact type or the exact types of other
agents to compute the optimal threshold strategy. Assum-
ing that there are a few clusters of agents with similar, but
not identical, types and/or assuming that agents do not nec-
essarily play their optimal threshold strategy, but do play
a strategy close to optimal both lead to a similar picture
of a system, which is one that we expect to see in practice:
we will get clusters of agents playing similar strategies (that
is, strategies with thresholds clustered around one value),
rather than all
agents in a cluster playing exactly the same strategy. This
change has relatively little impact on our results.
Rather than seeing straight lines representing populations
with a sharp gap between them, as in Figure 3, we expect
slightly curved lines representing a cluster of similar popu-
lations,
with somewhat smoother transitions.
5. OPTIMIZING THE MONEY SUPPLY
In Section 4 we considered how money is distributed among
agents of different types, assuming that the money supply
is fixed. We now want to examine what happens to the
distribution of money as the amount of money changes. In
particular, we want to determine the amount that optimizes
the performance of the system. We will show that increasing
the amount of money improves performance up to a certain
point, after which the system experiences a monetary crash.
Once the system crashes, the only equilibrium will be the
trivial one where all agents play S0. Thus, optimizing the
performance of the system is a matter of finding out just
how much money the system can handle before it crashes.
Before we can start talking about optimal money supply,
we have to answer a more fundamental question: given an
equilibrium, how good is it? Consider a single round of the
game with a homogeneous population of some fixed type t.
If a request is satisfied, social welfare increases by γt − αt;
the requester gains γt utility and the satisfier pays a cost
of αt. If no request is satisfied then no utility is gained.
What is the probability that a request will be satisfied? This
requires two events to occur. First, the agent chosen to make
a request must have a dollar, which happens with probability
1−M0. Second, there must be a volunteer able and willing
to satisfy the request. Any agent who does not have his
threshold amount of money is willing to volunteer. Thus,
if τ is the fraction of agents at their threshold then the
probability of having a volunteer is 1 − (1 − βt)
(1−τ)n. We
believe that in most large systems this probability is quite
close to 1; otherwise, either βt must be unrealistically small
or
τ must be very close to 1. For example, even if
β = .01 (i.e., an agent can satisfy 1% of requests), 1000
agents will be able to satisfy 99.99% of requests. If τ is close
to 1, then agents will have an easier time earning money
then spending money (the probability of spending a dollar
is at most 1/n, while for large β the probability of earning a
dollar if an agent volunteers is roughly (1/n)(1/(1− τ ))). If
an agent is playing S4 and there are n rounds played a day,
this means that for τ = .9 he would be willing to pay α today
to receive γ over 10 years from now. For most systems, it
seems unreasonable to have δ or γ/α this large. Thus, for
the purposes of our analysis, we
approximate 1− (1− βt)
(1−τ)n by 1.
With this approximation, we can write the expected in-
crease in social welfare each round as (1−M0)(γt−αt). Since
we have discount factor δt, the total expected social welfare
summed over all rounds is (1 −M0)(γt − αt)/(1 − δt). For
heterogeneous types, the situation is essentially the same.
Our
equation for social welfare is more complicated because
now the gain in welfare depends on the γ, α, and δ of the
agents chosen in that round, but the overall analysis is the
same, albeit with more cases. Thus our goal is clear: find
the amount of money that, in equilibrium, minimizes M0.
Many of the theorems in Section 3 begin “For all m there
exist δ∗ and n∗ such that if (T, ~f, n) is a payoff-heterogeneous
population with n > n∗ and δt > δ
∗ for all t”. Intuitively,
the theorems require large δts to ensure that agents are pa-
tient enough that their decisions are dominated by long-run
behavior rather than short-term utility, and large n to en-
sure that small changes in the distribution of money do not
move it far from the maximum-entropy distribution. In the
following theorem and many of our later results, we want to
assume
that this condition is satisfied so that we can apply the
theorems from Section 3. To simplify the statements of our
theorems, we use “the standard conditions hold for m” to
mean that the population (T, ~f , n) under consideration is
such that n > n∗ and δt > δ
∗ for the n∗ and δ∗ that the
theorems require for m.
Theorem 5.1. Let (T, ~f , n) be a payoff-heterogeneous pop-
ulation such that the standard conditions hold for m and
m′, m < m′, and ~k is a nontrivial equilibrium for (T, ~f, n)
and m. Then if the average amount of money is m′, best-
reply dynamics starting at ~k will converge to some equilib-
rium ~k′ ≤ ~k. Moreover, if ~k is the maximum equilibrium
for m, then ~k′ is the maximum equilibrium for m′. Fur-
thermore, if ~π(~k) is the distribution over strategies induced
by (T, ~f, n) and ~k, and ~k′ is a nontrivial equilibrium, then
(M∗
~π(~k′),m′
)0 ≤ (M
∗
~π(~k),m
)0.
Proof. (Sketch) Suppose that in the equilibrium with
m, all agents of type t use the threshold strategy Skt . Then
(M∗
~π(~k),m
)ki = λ
i
m/
Pk
j=0 λ
j
m, where λm is the value of that
satisfies constraint (1) for m. It is relatively straightforward
to show that if m < m′, then λm < λm′ . If the equi-
librium threshold strategy with both m and m′ were the
same, then the desired result would be immediate. Unfortu-
nately, changing the average amount of money may change
the best-reply function. However, since λm′ > λm, it can be
shown that (M∗
~π(~k),m′
)kt0 ≤ (M
∗
~π(~k),m
)ktkt and (M
∗
~π(~k),m
)ktkt ≥
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(M∗
~π(~k),m
)ktkt , for all k This increases the probability of an
agent earning a dollar, so the best reply can only decrease.
Thus, BR(T,~f),m′(
~k) ≤ ~k. Applying best-reply dynamics
to BR(T,~f),m′ starting at
~k, as in Theorem 3.3, gives us an
equilibrium ~k′ such that ~k′ ≤ ~k. Decreasing strategies only
serves to further decrease (M∗
~π(~k′),m′
)
k′
t
0 , so as long as
~k is
nontrivial we will have (M∗
~π(~k′),m′
)0 ≤ (M
∗
~π(~k),′
)0.
Theorem 5.1 makes several strong statements about what
happens to social welfare as the amount of money increases
(assuming there is no monetary crash). Taking the worst-
case view, we know social welfare at the maximum equilib-
rium will increase. Alternatively, we can think of the system
as being jolted out of equilibrium by a sudden addition of
money. If agents react to this using best-reply dynamics
and find a new nontrivial equilibrium, social welfare will
have increased. In general, Theorem 5.1 suggests that, as
long as nontrivial equilibria exist, the more money the bet-
ter. As the following theorem shows, increasing the amount
of money
sufficiently leads to a monetary crash; moreover, once
the system has crashed, adding more money does not make
things better.
Corollary 5.1. If (T, ~f, n) is a payoff-heterogeneous pop-
ulation for which the standard conditions hold for m, then
there exists a finite threshold mT,~f such that there exists a
nontrivial equilibrium if the average amount of money is less
than m
T,~f
and there does not exist a nontrivial equilibrium
if the average amount of money is greater than mT,~f . (A
nontrivial equilibrium may or may not exist if the average
amount of
money is exactly mT,~f .)
Proof. Fix (T, ~f , n). To see that there is some average
amount of money m for which there is no nontrivial equilib-
rium in this population, consider any average amount m. If
there is no nontrivial equilibrium with m, then we are done.
Otherwise, suppose the maximum equilibrium
with m is ~km. Let ~k be such that BR
t
T,~f,m
(∞, . . . ,∞) =
kt. We must have ~km ≤ ~k.
Choose m′ >
P
t ftkt.
Suppose that the maximum equilibrium with m′ is ~km′ .
By Theorem 5.1, we must have ~km′ ≤ ~km. Thus, ~km′ ≤ ~k.
But if ~km′ is a nontrivial equilibrium, then in equilibrium,
each agent of type t has at most kt dollars, so the average
amount of money in the system is at mostP
t ftkt < m
′. Thus, there cannot be a nontrivial equilib-
rium if the average amount of money is m′.
Letm
T,~f
be the infimum over allm for which no nontrivial
equilibrium exists with population (T, ~f , n) if the average
amount of money is m. Clearly, by choice of mT,~f , if m <
mT,~f , there is a nontrivial equilibrium. Now suppose that
m > mT,~f . By the construction ofmT,~f , there existsm
′ with
m > m′ > mT,~f such that no nontrivial equilibrium exists
if the average amount of money is m′. Suppose, by way
of contradiction, that there exists a nontrivial equilibrium
if the average amount of money is m. Suppose that the
maximum equilibrium is ~k. By the same argument as that
used in Theorem 5.1, the maximum equilibrium ~k′ if the
average amount of money is m′ is such that ~k′ > ~k. Thus,
~k′ is a nontrivial equilibrium.
Figure 4 shows an example of the monetary crash in a
system with the same population used in Figure
2. Equilibria were found using best-reply dynamics start-
ing at (100, 100).
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Figure 4: Social welfare for various average amounts
of money, demonstrating a monetary crash.
In light of Corollary 5.1, the system designer should try
to find mT,~f . How can he do this? If he knows T and
~f ,
then he can perform a binary search for mT,~f by choosing
values of m and then using the algorithm from Section 3 to
see if a nontrivial equilibrium exists. Observing the system
over time and using the techniques described in Section 4
along with additional information he has about the system
may be enough to make this a practical option.
We expect a monetary crash to be a real phenomenon in
a system where the price of servicing a request is fixed. This
can be the case in
practice, as shown by in the babysitting co-op example.
If the price can change, we expect that as the money supply
increases,
there will be inflation; the price will increase so as to avoid
a crash. However, floating prices can create other monetary
problems, such as speculations, booms, and busts.
Floating prices also impose transaction costs on agents.
In systems where prices would normally be relatively stable,
these transaction costs may well outweigh the benefits of
floating prices.
6. ALTRUISTS AND HOARDERS
Thus far, we have considered standard agents with a type
of the form (α, β, γ, δ, ρ). We have a fairly complete picture
of what happens in a system with only standard agents:
increasing the money supply increases agent utility until a
certain threshold is passed and the system has a monetary
crash. However, any real system will have agents that, from
perspective of the designer, behave oddly.
These agents may be behaving irrationally or they may
simply have a different utility function. For our results to
be useful in practice, we need to understand how they are
affected by such nonstandard agents. We consider here two
such types of nonstandard agents, both of which have been
observed in real systems: altruists and hoarders. Altruists,
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who provide service without requiring payment, reduce the
incentive for standard agents to work. The end result is a
decrease in the equilibrium threshold for standard agents.
As a result, an excess of altruists, like an excess of money,
can cause standard agents to stop being willing to work.
However, up to the point where the system has a monetary
crash, altruists improve the utility of standard agents.
Hoarders, who want to collect as much money as possi-
ble whether it is actually useful or not, can be modeled as
playing S∞. Since hoarders effectively absorb money, they
make the remaining money more valuable, which increases
the threshold used by standard agents in equilibrium. This
results in reduced utility for standard agents, provided that
the amount of money in the system is constant.
Altruists may at first appear purely beneficial to standard
agents, since they satisfy requests with no cost to standard
agents. Indeed, as the following theorem shows, as long as
the system does not have a monetary crash, altruists do
make life better for standard agents. To show this, we as-
sume that a fraction a of requests get satisfied at no cost. In-
tuitively, these are the requests satisfied by the altruists, al-
though the following result also applies to any setting where
agents occasionally have a (free) outside option.
Theorem 6.1. Consider a homogeneous population and
assume that the standard conditions hold for m. Suppose
that a fraction a of requests can be satisfied at no cost. Then
as long as the system does not have a monetary crash, social
welfare increases as a increases (assuming
that the maximum equilibrium is always played).
Proof. (Sketch) As we discussed in Section 5, the ex-
pected social welfare with a single type of standard agent is
(1−M0)(γ−α)/(1− δ). Rounds where a request is satisfied
at no cost generate social welfare of aγ/(1 − δ). The same
analysis as in Section 5 shows that the remaining rounds
generate social welfare of (1− a)(1−M0(a))(γ−α)/(1− δ),
where M0(a) is the new equilibrium value of M0 given that
a fraction a of requests are satisfied at no cost. Thus, the
total welfare as a function of a is
aγ/(1− δ) + (1− a)(1−M0(a))(γ − α)/(1− δ).
To see that this increases as a increases, we would like to take
the derivative relative to a to get (γ+(γ−α)(−M ′0(a)(1−a)−
(1 −M0(a))))/(1− δ). Unfortunately M0(a) may not even
be continuous. Because strategies are integers, there will be
regions where M0(a) is constant, and then a jump when a
critical value of a is reached that causes the equilibrium to
change. In those regions where M0(a) is constant, M
′
0(a) is
0. Since 1/(1 − δ)(γ + (γ − α)(−(1 −M0(a)))) is positive,
social welfare is increasing in these regions. At points where
M0(a) jumps, the equilibrium strategies will decrease. The
proof of Theorem 5.1 shows that this decreases the value of
M0(a) (unless the system crashes). This means that social
welfare also increases at these points, so social welfare will
always increase unless the system crashes.
Theorem 6.1 shows that altruists do not hurt provided
that there are not enough them to crash the monetary sys-
tem. But what if there are enough to crash the monetary
system? As Adar and Huberman [2] observed, this is essen-
tially what has happened in Gnutella, where 70% of agents
do not share any files, and nearly 50% of responses are from
the top 1% of sharing hosts. In cases like this, whether
standard agents are better off depends on
the parameters of the system; the altruists may be satis-
fying fewer requests than would be satisfied in a cooperative
equilibrium, but they are also not imposing the cost of sat-
isfying these requests on the standard agents.
Turning to hoarders, it seems in practice that whenever a
system allows agents to accumulate something, be it work
done, as in Seti@home, friends on online social networking
sites, or “gold” in an online game, a certain group of agents
seems to make it their goal to accumulate as much of it as
possible. In pursuit of this, they will engage in behavior
that seems irrational. For simplicity here, we model hoard-
ers as playing the strategy S∞. This means that they will
volunteer under all circumstances. Our analysis would not
change significantly if we also required that they never made
a request for work. Our first result shows that, for a fixed
money supply, having more hoarders makes standard agents
worse off.
Theorem 6.2. Suppose that the standard agents in a sys-
tem are described by
(T, ~f). Let fH be the fraction of hoarders (i.e., with prob-
ability fH an agent is a hoarder and with probability 1− fH
he is
described by (T, ~f, n)). Assume that (T, ~f , n) satisfies the
standard conditions
for m. Then, as fH increases, the utility of standard
agents in the maximum equilibrium decreases.
Proof. (Sketch) Increasing fH is equivalent to taking
some number of standard agents and increasing their strat-
egy to S∞. Lemma 3.2 shows us that the thresholds in equi-
librium do not decrease. It can be shown by examining the
formula for the maximum-entropy distribution that increas-
ing strategies increases M0. As the discussion in Section 5
shows, this will decrease agent utility.
Both Theorem 6.1 and 6.2 assume that the average amount
of money in the system remains constant. However, the ac-
tions of both hoarders and altruists are visible to a system
designer. The designer can take their existence into account
when setting the money supply. As a general guideline, al-
truists require that money be removed from the system while
hoarders require that it be added.
Hoarders also have a beneficial aspect. As we have ob-
served, a monetary crash occurs when a dollar becomes val-
ueless because there are no agents willing to take it. How-
ever, with hoarders in the system, there is always someone
to take it. Suppose that every standard agent in a system
with hoarders plays S0. As we saw in Lemma 4.2, we can
compute the expected utility for having a single dollar and
playing S1. As long as this utility is greater than α, the best
reply will be greater than S0. From Theorem 3.3, it follows
that there will be a nontrivial equilibrium. Therefore, by
Theorem 5.1, increasing m will always increase social wel-
fare. In practice, this seems like an unrealistic outcome. It
seems likely that hoarders hoard only if money is seen
as a scarce resource. Thus, as a practical matter, there
is likely to be a limit to how far the system designer can
increase m.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
For our model of a scrip system with payoff-heterogeneous
types, we have proved that equilibria exist in threshold strate-
gies and that the distribution of money in these equilibria
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is given by maximum entropy. As part of our equilibrium
argument, we showed that the best-reply function is mono-
tone. This proves the existence of equilibria in pure strate-
gies and permits efficient algorithms to compute these equi-
libria. We have also examined some of the practical implica-
tions of these theoretical results. For someone interested in
studying the agents of scrip systems, our characterization of
equilibrium distribution of money forms the basis for tech-
niques relevant to inferring characteristics of the agents of a
scrip system from the distribution of money. For a system
designer, our results on optimizing the money supply pro-
vide a simple maxim: keep adding money until the system is
about to experience a monetary crash. Finally, we provide
insight into the effects of altruists and hoarders on a scrip
system, as well as providing guidance to system designers
for dealing with them.
There remain a number of interesting areas for future
work, including the following:
• Our theoretical results all assume that agents are merely
payoff
heterogeneous. Varying β or the request rate poses
a problem for our techniques because the stationary
distribution of the Markov chain
will no longer be uniform, so we can no longer describe
the equilibrium distribution of money using maximum
entropy. However, there is nothing about this type
of heterogeneity that intuitively poses a problem for
convergence or threshold strategies. Indeed, we would
expect that, knowing the average amount of money for
one particular
type, the distribution of money within that type should
still follow a maximum-entropy distribution, because
of the uniformity within the type. This would lead to
a distribution of money that has a similar
form, although now each type would have a different
value of λ. If this is the case, many of our results still
hold.
• It seems unlikely that altruism and hoarding are the
only two types of “irrational” behavior we will find in
real systems. Are there other major types that our
model can provide insight into?
• It seems natural that the behavior of a very small
group of agents should not be able to change the over-
all behavior of the system. Can we prove results about
equilibria and utility when a small group follows an ar-
bitrary strategy? This is particularly relevant when
modeling attackers. See [1] for general results in this
setting.
• Our model makes a number of strong predictions about
the agent strategies, distribution of money, and effects
of variations in the money supply. It also provides
techniques to help analyze characteristics of agents of
a scrip system. It would be interesting to test these
predictions on a real functioning scrip system to ei-
ther validate the model or gain insight from where its
predictions are incorrect.
• What happens if we allow prices to vary over time, and
have α and γ varying by round
as in the work of Hens et al. [6]. In this setting thresh-
old strategies still seem natural to determine whether
to work, but now the threshold would have to be a
function of α and the payment that would be received
rather than a constant. Furthermore, agents may wish
to not make a request at all (even if they have the
money to pay for it) if γ is too small or the cost is
too large. Again, we would expect to see thresholding
behavior in these strategies.
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